Artificial Intelligence Systems Are Not Inventors… Yet.

Recently, an Artificial Intelligence (AI) named DABUS (“Device for Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience”) made international media buzz when it was listed as an inventor on patent applications filed in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO).  While there have been thousands of patent applications for various AI systems, from machine learning (ML) systems, to neural networks, generative adversarial networks (GANs) and beyond, this is at least one of the first AI systems to be listed as the inventor itself.

What is DABUS

Developed by Stephen Thaler, a well-known expert in the field of AI, DABUS is an implementation of a type of generative adversarial network (GAN), where two or more neural networks are used to play against one another in order to improve the outputs of at least one of the neural networks to create something different and new.

In the most common implementation, a GAN comprises two neural networks.  The first is a generator, which is used to generate new data (e.g., images, text).  The second is a discriminator, which is used to determine whether the data generated by the generator is real or fake.

In order to determine fakes, the discriminator is given a (preferably large) dataset of real data to compare the data generated by the generator against.  Like a high-tech game of cops and robbers, the discriminator is trying to identify the fake data provided to it from the generator.  Each time the generator fails to convince the discriminator of the validity of its generated data, it learns.  This process is repeated at the incredible rate that computing does these days.  The results, can be stunning.   In fact, a piece of artwork generated by such GANs recently sold at Christie’s for $432,000.

DABUS operates on this same principal.  Give a dataset to a discriminator as a training model and let the generator try to fool the discriminator.  Now, of course, Dr. Thaler uniquely calls his generator an Imagitron, and his discriminator a Perceptron, but ultimately it is still a GAN, doing what a GAN does.

What did DABUS “Invent”

Without getting into the debate or hype over what was actually “conceived” by DABUS, the actual products that were more aptly described as “designed” by DABUS are: 1) an interlocking food container; and 2) a light that flashes in a particular way that mimics neural activity.  I do not intend to go into the details of these inventions, as they have been discussed ad nauseum elsewhere.

Regardless of what DABUS designed, the inventions themselves were based on datasets and information provided to it.  As was said excellently elsewhere, “[DABUS] was ‘mentored’ by Dr. Thaler over a two month period to produce increasingly complex concepts.”  Put differently, DABUS did not set out on its own to solve the problem of interlocking containers or calming pulsating lights; rather, DABUS was tasked with solving these concerns.

The Patent Applications

The three patent applications were submitted by a group led by Ryan Abbott, a professor of law and health sciences at the University of Surrey in the United Kingdom.  Not unsurprisingly, a novel question of law has been raised by an academic.  And that is not a criticism, but rather an acknowledgement that patent law will have to address certain pressing questions about the patentability and ownership of inventions in a world that is increasingly being influenced by artificial intelligence and its effects.

The question at issue here is whether, given the “creative” output of DABUS qualifies it as an “inventor” under the laws of the patent offices the applications were filed in.  For instance, in the USPTO, the Manual for Patent Examining Procedure defines an inventor as a person who contributes to the conception of the invention.

Here, Dr. Abbott and his team are suggesting that DABUS, through its processing of the data into a useful invention, contributed to its conception in such a manner that it would have to be considered an inventor under that definition.  Others, such as Dr. Noam Shemtov, state that DABUS, and other AI systems are merely tools.  In a 2019 report commissioned by the EPO, Dr. Shemtov writes:

When it comes to a human actor that uses an AI system, whose identity may be inconsequential to the invention process, who simply uses a machine learning technique developed by another, the inventor may be the person who “tooled” the AI system in a particular way in order to generate the inventive output. Hence, under such circumstances the person that carries out the intelligent or creative conception of the invention may be the one who geared up the AI system towards producing the inventive output, taking decisions in relation to issues such as the choice of the algorithm employed, the selection of parameters and the design and choice of input data, even if the specific output was somewhat unpredictable[i].

While I tend to agree with Dr. Shemtov’s analysis of current AI systems as tools that individuals use to provide useful output, that is not to say that it is impossible to conceive that an AI system in the future will able to identify a problem, identify available materials/components/data, and solve the problem on its own, all without human intervention or direction.  And herein lies where Dr. Abbott’s filing of the patent applications with DABUS as an inventor is truly aimed at addressing – AIs as inventors.

AI Inventorship

Dr. Abbott’s true intention appears to be raising the debate over whether current statutory regimes at the various patent offices would allow for an AI to be listed as an inventor, given that even at present, it could be rationalized that the AI is part of the conception of the invention.  However, in the case of DABUS, it seems that there is a strong argument that the conception was at the hands of Dr. Thaler, and DABUS merely reduced the invention to practice.

Regardless, the issues related to having an AI system as an inventor are definitely worth bringing to light.  Dr. Abbott told BBC News, “These days, you commonly have AIs writing books and taking pictures – but if you don’t have a traditional author, you cannot get copyright protection in the US.”  And Dr. Abbott is not incorrect.  The United States Copyright Office published an opinion in 2014 stating that, “[O]nly works created by a human can be copyrighted under United States Law.”

Dr. Abbott continued, stating to BBC News, “So with patents, a patent office might say, ‘If you don’t have someone who traditionally meets human-inventorship criteria, there is nothing you can get a patent on.’ In which case, if AI is going to be how we’re inventing things in the future, the whole intellectual property system will fail to work.”  And again, Dr. Abbott is not incorrect.  35 U.S.C. § 100 defines an “inventor” as the “individual” who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.  If an AI system conceived of both the problem and the inventive solution to that problem, it becomes more difficult to say that the inventor of the AI system itself was the inventor of that invention, leaving that IP unable to be secured by patents under the current regime.

Similar inventorship issues arise in both the UK, where the UK Patents Act of 1977 requires an inventor to be a person, and the EPO, where in the EPO’s published opinion written by Dr. Shemtov states, “[I]t has been shown that is is unambiguously implicit that AI systems cannot be identified as inventors.”

All three patent offices where these DABUS patent applications have filed are aware of the issue and are reviewing options and requesting input from the community.  In fact, On August 27, 2019, the USPTO just released a Request for Comments on Patenting Artificial Intelligence on the Federal Register, asking for input on whether current US patent laws need to be revised to take into account inventions where an entity or entities other than a natural person contributed to the conception of an invention.

 Conclusion

While lofty news articles have hyped the filing of these patents in DABUS’s name, let us not fall for the smoke and mirrors associated with the current state of AI systems.  At least in the vast majority of existing AI systems, they are not inventors as we define them for the purpose of patents in the US.  They are advanced tools that assist in the reduction to practice of inventive concepts and inventions themselves.  DABUS is not an inventor for the purpose of US patent law.  However, using the leverage and momentum of a good news cycle, DABUS has been able to push forward the conversation on what will inevitably be questions about ownership and protection of all forms of Intellectual Property generated by AI systems in the future.

[i] Dr Noam Shemtov, “A study on inventorship in inventions involving AI activity” (2019)

Federal Circuit Decides You Can Patent Those Gains – Dietary Supplements Are Subject Matter Eligible

On March 15, 2019, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) heard an appeal in the matter of Natural Alternatives International, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC regarding the subject matter eligibility of dietary supplements.  At issue in the case were six patents related to the CarnoSyn® beta-alanine athletic performance supplement.

In reversing the lower court’s ruling, the CAFC found that each of the six patents contained patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.   In fact, the court found that the patents directed at the beta-alanine product, method of manufacturing the beta-alanine product, and method of using the beta-alanine product for treatment (i.e., improving athletic performance), were are all subject matter eligible, and therefore patentable.

With regards to the patents on the beta-alanine product, the Court noted that, “A claim to a manufacture or composition of matter made from a natural product is not directed to the natural product where it has different characteristics and ‘the potential for significant utility.’”  In the present case, the court found that the combination of a specific form of beta-alanine and glycine, and that the specific dosages of beta-alanine may increase athletic performance in a way that naturally occurring beta-alanine may not.

With respect to the patents on the method of administering beta-alanine, the Court likened the claims to those at issue in Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd, noting that, “Claims that are directed to particular methods of treatment are patent eligible[i].”  Here, the claims in the method patents are directed to administering beta-alanine to a human subject in order to overcome homeostasis and increase creatine production, resulting in physiological benefits to the subject.  The Court, in no unclear terms noted, “These are treatment claims, and as such they are patent eligible.[ii]

Finally, with regards to the manufacturing claims, the Court also found that subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was met by the fact that the claims were “[D]irected to the manufacture of a human dietary supplement with certain characteristics,[iii]” and that, “The supplement is not a product of nature and the use of the supplement to achieve a given result is not directed to a law of nature.[iv]

It is clear from the Court’s analysis that it is important to take certain precautions when drafting the specification and claims of patents directed to these dietary supplements and related products.  Here, the Court appeared to rely heavily on interpretations pulled from the specification of the patents at issue in order determine the claims were subject matter eligible.  For instance, the court looked to the specification of the patents to find the significance of dosing ranges, how they were calculated based on bodyweight, and how those dosing ranges were required to effectively increase athletic performance.   Applicants would be wise not to submit skimpy disclosures with a bare minimum of detail, as it could mean the difference between validity and invalidity of a patent.

Ultimately, the Court’s findings in the matter provide welcome guidance on the ever-challenging issue of subject matter eligibility under U.S.C. § 101.  The ruling gives clarity on the ability of sports nutrition companies to secure the lucrative rights in their proprietary performance enhancing dietary supplements; the dietary supplement market being valued at $152 billion (USD) as of 2018, and expected to grow to $220 billion (USD) by 2022[v].

 

 

[i] Natural Alternatives International, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC

[ii] Id.

[iii] Id.

[iv] Id.

[v] https://www.statista.com/statistics/828514/total-dietary-supplements-market-size-globally/

Federal Circuit Ruling Cast Shadow Over USPTO Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance

In January of 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued revised guidance relevant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Subject Matter Eligibility) rejections. Entitled, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, the document added a new pathway for patent eligibility, whereby a claim that includes a judicial exception is still subject matter eligible under 35. U.S.C. § 101, if the judicial exception, such as an abstract idea, is “integrated into a practical application” of the judicial exception.

A large portion of the legal community felt that the guidance would cut the number of rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The guidance provided much needed clarity on how to present claims in an application to avoid such rejections, which had become commonplace in several art units at the USPTO.

This updated guidance has been largely welcomed by the legal community.  In fact, in its comments to the USPTO on the matter, the American Bar Association stated, “[T]he guidelines are a significant improvement in the examination of patent eligibility by providing a greater degree of certainty and increased predictability in subject matter eligibility determinations at the USPTO.[i]”  However, with quite a bit of foreshadowing, the American Bar Association’s letter noted, “We understand that these Guidelines, however, do not constitute substantive rulemaking and thus do not ‘have the force and effect of law.’”

Fast forward to April 1, 2019, the Federal Circuit found two patents owned by Cleveland Clinic invalid for being directed to ineligible subject matter.  The patents in question were related to testing for cardiovascular disease, and in the opinion of the court, “invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to an ineligible natural law.[ii]

Cleveland Clinic had argued that the courts “failed to give the appropriate deference to subject matter eligibility guidelines published by the PTO.”  Relying on Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), Cleveland Clinic argued that, “Skidmore ‘requires courts to give some deference to informal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory dictates, with the degree of deference depending on the circumstances.’[iii]”.

However, the Federal Circuit noted, “While we greatly respect the PTO’s expertise on all matters relating to patentability, including patent eligibility, we are not bound by its guidance. And, especially regarding the issue of patent eligibility and the efforts of the courts to determine the distinction between claims directed to natural laws and those directed to patent-eligible applications of those laws, we are mindful of the need for consistent application of our case law.”

So while the USPTO appears to be loosening the reigns on subject matter eligibility, the Federal Circuit does not appear to be following suit.  And while the Cleveland Clinic v. True Health case did not specifically address the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, the courts opinion clearly noted that the USPTO’s guidance was not the ultimate arbiter on subject matter eligibility.

Ultimately, from a prosecution perspective, it may be wise to not solely rely on the broader interpretations of subject matter eligibility provided under the latest USPTO guidance, and include at least some claims that would survive more rigorous scrutiny under the tests outlined and applied by the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States.

 

[i] https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/eligibility2019comments_a_abaipl_2019mar07.pdf

[ii] http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/18-1218.Opinion.4-1-2019.pdf

[iii] See, Stephenson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 705 F.3d 1323, 1330) (Fed Cir. 2013)

PTAB Finds Subject Matter Eligibility in Hybrid Trading System

The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), on Tuesday, March 19, 2019, marked as “Informative” the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) finding in Ex parte Smith (2018-00064).  The matter involved a panel of judges at the PTAB finding “claims directed to a hybrid trading system for concurrently trading securities or derivatives through both electronic and open-outcry trading mechanisms” patent eligible subject matter under the revised guidance relevant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Subject Matter Eligibility) rejections.  While finding the decision “Informative” is below a fully “Precedential” decision, these “Informative” decisions help guide the judges on “recurring issues.”

The examiner had initially determined that the claims were directed to “an abstract idea of trading derivatives in a hybrid exchange system which is a concept within the realm of ‘fundamental economic practices’ because the concept relates to the economy and commerce.” See, Ex parte Smith (2018-00064).  The examiner determined that under the Alice test, since this was an abstract idea, and that under the Alice step 2 analysis, the claims were directed at generic computer components and did not impose any meaningful limits on the scope of the claims, the claims were therefore patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The board initially identified the claims as being directed to methods of organizing human activity, a category of inventions under 35 U.S.C. § 101 that constitutes an abstract idea, namely fundamental economic practices.  The board then reviewed the claims under the revised guidance relevant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Subject Matter Eligibility) rejections. Using this guidance, the board determined that the claims were “integrated into a practical application” of the abstract idea, and therefore patent eligible subject matter.

Interestingly enough, the board’s determination that the claims were “integrated into a practical application” was based primarily on claim elements directed to the use of timers to delay automatically executing market orders (i.e., electronic) to allow “in-crowd” market orders (i.e., from “in the pits”).  A majority of the panel of judges for the board did note that that felt these timers were not trivial timers, but it was not a unanimous panel.  One judge did dissent, under the idea that these timers, no matter how they were implemented, were not “[T]echnical in nature and do not provide any ‘technical solution to a technical problem’ as contemplated by the Federal Circuit in DDR and Amdocs.” See, Ex parte Smith (2018-00064).

Conclusion

The marking of Ex parte Smith (2018-00064) as “Informative” with respect to patentability is a good sign for applicants in the space of computer implemented inventions of all sorts, but especially for those in the financial services space.  We are seeing more and more positive outcomes from the PTAB with respect to how they plan to leverage the new guidance on subject matter eligibility as it relates to abstract ideas “integrated into a practical application.”

While there have been some interesting developments at the Federal Circuit, which we will post about separately, guidance from the USPTO appears to favor subject matter eligibility for well-tailored claims that involve computer implemented subject matter.

New Guidance from the USPTO – a Boon for Patent Applicants

On January 4, 2019, the USPTO announced the issuance of revised guidance relevant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Subject Matter Eligibility) rejections. Entitled, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, the document adds a new pathway for patent eligibility, whereby a claim that includes a judicial exception is still subject matter eligible under 35. U.S.C. § 101, if the judicial exception is “integrated into a practical application” of the judicial exception. The guidance was incorporated into the Federal Register on January 7, 2019, and applies to all USPTO personnel, which includes the examiners that review applications for 35 U.S.C. § 101 concerns, and the administrative judges that oversee appeals and disputes on these issues.

Of considerable note, the new procedure, referred to in the guidance and Federal Register as “revised Step 2A,” changes how Step 2A of the Alice/Mayo test is applied.

The old Step 2A asked whether a claim is directed to a judicial exception.   There are three enumerated judicial exceptions: 1) laws of nature; 2) natural phenomena; and 3) abstract ideas. If a claim had no judicial exception, it was patent eligible subject matter.  If a claim did have a judicial exception, the analysis would then move to Step 2B for further review.

The revised Step 2A still looks to see if there is a judicial exception in a claim, and if there is no judicial exception, the claim is considered directed to patent eligible subject matter.  However, the revised Step 2A differs in that if a judicial exception is identified, the claim is still directed to patent eligible subject matter if the judicial exception is “integrated into a practical application” of the judicial exception. For example, if a patent application with claims directed to a software method which incorporated an abstract idea, so long as that abstract idea is integrated into a practical application of that abstract idea, the claim is directed to patent eligible subject matter and may still be entitled to patenting.

 

The Guidance in Action at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Now that a little over a month has passed since the new guidance has gone into effect, we are starting to see some opinions from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).  While the PTAB has still issued a greater number of affirmed 101 rejections than reversals since the new guidance, the opinions have been positive with respect to those reversals.

One very telling reversal came on application 14/282,015, for claims directed to a software-based system for vehicles that allows users to provide consent for installing optional software updates that add a feature to a vehicle module or adjust a configuration of an existing feature, and, in lack of receipt of such consent, displaying an icon in a gauge cluster in the vehicle.  The examiner had initially rejected the claims under 101 as directed to: i) the abstract idea of updating software; and ii) organizing human activity (i.e., receiving consent to take an action).

The PTAB reversed, noting that there was a “specific practical application” of the abstract ideas in the claims.   The PTAB found that the claims were “directed to a practical application of updating software specifically for a vehicle module, in which user consent is required and in which lack of receipt of user consent is communicated to a user via an icon within the gauge cluster of a vehicle.  The opinion also noted that the claims were “directed to providing in a head unit display of the vehicle an indication of an optional status of the software update and a request for consent to install the optional update and upon receipt of user consent sends an update command over the vehicle bus and installs the update to a memory of the vehicle module.”

Notably, here we have an opinion from the PTAB identifying a quite low bar for application of the “practical application” standard.  In this case, the “practical application” seems to be not much more than having a prompt for approval that you would see on any software update (e.g., “accept the new Terms of Service”) and then displaying an icon on a display when there is an update still pending approval.

The second opinion we find interesting is one involving US Patent Application No. 12/374,372, and the following claim in particular:

A method of surfing the Internet comprising: a. selecting information on a web page; b. clicking on the information as it resides on the web page; and c. in response to the clicking, conducting a web search on the information.

The PTAB’s opinion in this case is less telling on the what constitutes “practical application” standard, as the opinion does not make such an analysis, and merely focuses on the examiner’s failing to adequately assert a valid analysis of the claim as an abstract idea unto itself.  Rather, the opinion simply notes that:

[T]he Examiner’s factual findings regarding the underlying abstract idea to overgeneralize the claimed invention under the patent eligibility guidelines at the time of the rejection in the Final Action and Examiner’s Answer and this same overgeneralized abstract idea similarly does not meet the Examiner’s requisite burden for analysis under the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance.

 Given the simplicity and breadth of the claim, it is likely good news for applicants with inventions in the software space that the PTAB is not outright viewing broad claims as inherently abstract under the new guidance.  The opinion does note other likely issues with the application, but it is in the context of the PTAB’s views on 101 with which we are concerned.

Conclusion

It has only been a month since the USPTO issued the latest in subject matter eligibility guidance, and our initial impressions of how the PTAB is using the new guidance is positive and optimistic.  Even though a greater percentage of opinions citing the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance affirmed the 101 findings of the examiner, the limited numbers are not truly representative of what we expect to see over the long run.  Further, a closer look at those affirmed 101 findings leads us to believe that the cases were destined to be maintained, regardless of the updated guidance.

Most notably for us is that the current interpretation of what constitutes when claimed subject matter is “integrated into a practical application” of the judicial exception seems to be initially very favorable for applicants, particularly for those with inventions in the software space.

Patenting and Protecting Artificial Intelligence in the United States

Advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have been occurring at an ever-increasing rate, impacting almost every field of technology, from medical diagnosis and analysis, to driverless cars, to automated securities trading platforms, all the way to home security[i].  The arms of AI can be felt in every industry, in one way or another. Given the speed of advancement and the very nature of AI itself, it is important to consider the complex landscape around how to protect improvements in the AI space.

At first, it is important to note the types of intellectual property (IP) protection that can apply to inventions in the AI space.  The definition of IP generally comprises the core four – patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets.  In the case of AI, each of these may apply, and each has its own particular usefulness and advantages.  Further, each of these types of IP has its own concerns with respect to the timing of obtaining the protection.  For this article, we will primarily be focusing on the two areas of protection that generally are of the most concern – patents and copyrights.

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Patenting AI

AI, in almost all cases, exists as a software component.  Depending on what the use case for the AI is, there may also be a hardware component (e.g., vision system, sensors, actuators), but these hardware components are generally peripheral to the core AI, which is software based.  While AI inventions based in combined software and hardware solutions or standalone software-based solutions may both be patentable, the analysis for whether an AI based system constitutes patent eligible subject matter does take into consideration what is actually involved.

Where there is a corresponding hardware component in use with the software-based AI component, the subject matter eligibility analysis is usually relatively simple, favoring eligibility over not.  For instance, if an AI system is used to automatically control a series of vision systems (e.g., security cameras) and detect intruders, the invention is likely eligible for patent protection from a subject matter perspective, assuming the application is drafted appropriately.

Where the AI system solely exists as a software solution, an examiner at the USPTO will likely give the invention more scrutiny under the subject matter eligibility tests.  We have written more on the patentability of software-based inventions in a separate article that you can find here. However, while patent applications directed to software only inventions may receive additional scrutiny, true AI inventions likely are sufficient to overcome these rejections.  In fact, USPTO Director Andrei Iancu has even discussed the patentability of AI, through discussions of “[H]uman-made algorithms”, during a hearing regarding the oversight of the USPTO in April of 2018.   Again, the critical point in securing a patent in a solely software based AI invention is appropriate drafting of the application.

With respect to patenting AI based inventions, particularly as it relates to the software component of the AI, it is important to note that a utility patent covers the functionality of the software, through defining the software in terms of systems and methods.  What patents do not cover is the actual code.  Source code is covered largely by copyright, which can protect direct copying of the code, but not those who write their own code to perform the same functionality.

In defining what an inventor wants to protect with respect to their software-based AI invention, it is important to look at the invention in terms of a method, or a series of steps.  Considering everything a computer does is generally a series of steps involving processing some data, framing the inventive aspects of the software-based AI invention in such a methodological manner is generally straightforward.

What inventors want to avoid is viewing the invention in the abstract, or very high-level depiction.  For instance, you cannot get a patent on the idea of “an AI based dating platform”, but you could potentially get a patent on the methods performed by the AI in order to find compatible matches (e.g., based on training models and predictive analytics).  So, a focus needs to be on what actual occurs in order to make the invention possible, not solely focusing on a conclusory statement about what problem is being solved.

Another important thing to remember when seeking patent protection for AI inventions, or any invention, is to do so sooner rather than later.  There are two main drivers for this.  First, the USPTO, and most if not all other national patent offices are “first-to-file” for priority on inventions.  What this means is that, even if you get to the market first with your invention, or conceived of the idea before another inventor, if another party’s application gets to the patent office before yours, then the patent rights will be theirs, and you will be prevented from getting a patent on the invention.

The second reason is that your ability to get a patent on an invention, even without worrying about what others are doing, can be jeopardized if you offer for sale or otherwise disclose your invention publicly before filing.  The USPTO gives you one year from making a public disclosure of the invention to file your patent application.  However, the rest of the world is not so nice, with many jurisdictions making it a bar on patentability if you publicly disclose your invention prior to filing a patent application in at least one jurisdiction first.

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Copyrighting AI

With respect to copyrighting all or portions of an invention based in AI, there are certain aspects of these inventions which are protectable and those which are not.  Copyrights cover artistic works, which includes everything from literary works, to graphical/visual works (e.g., paintings, movies, photographs), to musical works and even choreographed dances.

When considering copyrighting portions of an AI based invention, the focus is generally on copyrighting the source code.  Source code is considered a literary work for the purposes of copyrights, and inventors can receive a federal copyright registration in the uncompiled source code.

What is protected by a copyright registration on source code is the copying of the actual code.  It does not prevent others from creating code of their own that performs the same functions.  However, it does restrict the copying of subsets of the whole code, such as the copying of a module, or a series of functions.

One issue when considering copyrighting source code is how frequently the source code is updated.  Rarely is there a piece of software that is static for very long.   Updates in source code, while they may be considered derivative works of the originally copyrighted code, may not be independently covered by the initial registration.  Inventors should consider at what point they want to secure additional copyrights on later versions of a software-based invention.

It is important to note that while a copyright registration can be done at any time, as the works form in the author upon creation, statutory damages and attorneys fees are generally only available if the copyright registration is filed within 3-months of publication of the work[ii].  Filing your registration after that point will limit damages to “actual damages” (e.g., lost profit), which can be harder to prove.

Separately, more and more we see the question about whether it is possible to copyright the output of AI.  Recently there have been numerous instances of AI generating their own artistic works, such as The Next Rembrandt and Bayou.  The law is currently unsettled as to whether these works would be copyrightable.  For instance, in April of 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Copyright Act only provides standing to humans[iii].  The case, involving copyrights associated with a Monkey Selfie, but the same findings would presumably extend to works authored by AI.

Of course, numerous scholarly and legal minds believe that works would be derivative works of the individuals who wrote the code for the AI, and as such those individuals would be the rightful owners of works generated by the AI.  We ultimately will have to wait to see how this plays out in the future.

 

Conclusion

Overall, it is important to understand and analyze what aspects of an AI based invention can be secured early on in the process.  Timing is crucial for both patents and copyrights with respect to being able to secure the rights and receiving the greatest protection available under the laws.  This area of technology is moving quickly, so delay and lack of planning can be devastating. Devoting at least some time to do the analysis may help with providing a roadmap for how and when to protect various aspects of your AI based invention so that you reap the greatest rewards possible.

[i]Check out our client Deep Sentinel: https://www.deepsentinel.com/

[ii] See, 17 U.S.C., 412 https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/412

[iii] Naruto v. Slater http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2018/04/23/16-15469.pdf

 

Accelerating Patent Grants and Reducing Costs for Inventors from Singapore by Leveraging the US Patent System

Companies and Inventors from Singapore can leverage programs at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to substantially accelerate the process of obtaining of a patent in Singapore, all while reducing the overall cost to create a global patent portfolio.

 

Background

It may come as no surprise that Singapore ranked as one of the most innovative countries in the world.  Singapore ranked #3 in the most recent 2018 Bloomberg Innovation Index.   Singapore also ranked #3 in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, and #5 in the International Property Rights Index.

Specific areas of technology that Singapore may be known best for pushing the boundaries on are: 1) Immersive Media; 2) Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Data Science; 3) Cybersecurity; and 4) Internet of Things (IoT) and future communications 1.  All areas that are of worldwide significance and growth.  Given this, the innovations developed in Singapore are of global appeal and warrant analysis of whether international protection of the intellectual property associated with those inventions are advisable.

Given that international protection of intellectual property rights can be costly and take a lot of time to obtain, it is important to consider all ways that the process can be optimized for both time and cost.

 

Time and Cost Analysis – Singapore

Preparing and filing a patent in almost any jurisdiction is not an inexpensive endeavor.  An inventor can expect to spend around S$10,000-20,000 in professional fees for the drafting of a patent application in Singapore, and filing fees that start around S$1,700.  At current exchange rates, that is an estimated $8,500-15,800 USD.

According to the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore (IPOS), the average time to get a patent through until grant is about 2-4 years.

 

Time and Cost Analysis – United States

Preparing and filing a patent in the United States is similar in complexity to doing so in Singapore.  Drafting expenses may be slightly lower, with estimated professional fees for preparing a patent application averaging about $6,000-10,000 USD (S$8,200-13700) (our firm averages slightly lower drafting fees of around $4,000-$8,000 USD). Standard filing fees are also a bit lower, with a small entity (companies with fewer than 500 employees) having a base filing fee of $785 USD (S$1,077).

The average time on a standard timeline application in the US is about 2-3 years.

 

Options to Accelerate in the US

Both the USPTO and the IPOS share options for accelerating examination of a patent application.  However, only the USPTO offers an easy acceleration process that is based solely on the payment of an additional fee.  Called Track I Prioritized Examination, the USPTO provides the ability for applicants to pay a fee ($2,000 for small entities or $1,000 for micro-entities) and receive a first office action in the merits, and final disposition within 1 year.

Done right, the Track I Prioritized Examination procedure at the USPTO gives patent applicants quick and clear insight on patentability of an invention.  The accelerated timeline of a Track I Prioritized Examination application also gives patent applicants the ability to have insight on whether foreign filings are worthwhile, will also providing options for accelerating granting of patents in those foreign jurisdiction.

For instance, applicants can leverage the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH), which is a series of agreements the US has with foreign patent offices, such as Singapore, whereby when a first patent office (e.g., USPTO) allows a patent application, the second patent office (e.g., Singapore) will, upon submission of a request, accelerate the examination of the patent in the second office.

I have written a blog post about this separately elsewhere.

 

One Caveat on Acceleration in Singapore

While the Track I prioritized examination of US applications is available for applications in any industry, IPOS does offer an option for inventions that are in the FinTech space that may be even more advantageous.  A new program launched in 2018 at IPOS, called the FinTech Fast Track initiative, aims to have the time to grant of such FinTech patent applications in as little as 6 months.

So, if your invention is in the FinTech space, you may still be best served by filing in Singapore.  However, if your invention is in any other technological field, the Track I Prioritized Examination application at the USPTO may offer additional benefits over filing directly in Singapore.

 

One Additional Requirement

Before filing directly in the USPTO, those applicants that are Singapore residents till must contact Singapore (IPOS) for national security clearance to file an application abroad before filing an application in Singapore.  Luckily, this is not a complex process and usually only takes a few days to a week or so prior to getting the appropriate clearances.

 

Conclusion

There are several options to accelerate receiving of a patent in the USPTO that should be quite interesting to Singapore companies and residents.  From reduced costs, to quicker allowances, and allowances that can accelerate issuance in Singapore as well as numerous other foreign countries.

With all the options available, it may be time to look at you or your company’s IP practices and identify whether some of these options may work to increase the value of your IP, while simultaneously reducing the cost to protect it.